unarr/internal/upgrade/signature_test.go

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fix(security): UPnP opt-in, bounded SSE reader, signed self-update Phase 2 security audit follow-up. Three independent hardenings against the unauthenticated daemon surface, the long-lived agent SSE stream and the self-update channel. UPnP is now opt-in. The stream port + /hls endpoints have no auth, so publishing them on the WAN via the gateway was a default that exposed active downloads to anyone scanning the operator's external IP. New config downloads.enable_upnp (default false) gates the mapping; LAN and Tailscale clients continue to work unchanged. A startup log makes the new default visible. The agent SSE reader now uses a bounded bufio.Scanner instead of an unbounded ReadString. A hostile or buggy server can no longer grow daemon memory by streaming a single line forever or by emitting unbounded data: continuation lines — both are capped at 256 KiB and 1 MiB respectively, and an error is surfaced so SignalLoop reconnects. Self-update now verifies an ed25519 signature over checksums.txt when the binary was built with a release public key embedded (injected via goreleaser ldflags from RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY). The companion scripts/sign-checksums runs in the release workflow when both the public-key variable and the private-key secret are present, uploading checksums.txt.sig next to the existing checksums file. Builds without the embedded key continue to update with SHA256-only verification; a --allow-unsigned flag is provided so users on a signed build can still install pre-signing releases or recover from an accidental unsigned release. A new scripts/gen-release-key helper documents the one-time keypair generation procedure required before flipping signing on.
2026-05-15 17:29:22 +02:00
package upgrade
import (
"context"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// withReleasePubKey temporarily swaps the embedded release public key and
// restores the previous value on test exit.
func withReleasePubKey(t *testing.T, encoded string) {
t.Helper()
prev := releasePubKeyBase64
releasePubKeyBase64 = encoded
t.Cleanup(func() { releasePubKeyBase64 = prev })
}
func TestSignatureVerificationDisabledByDefault(t *testing.T) {
withReleasePubKey(t, "")
if SignatureVerificationConfigured() {
t.Fatal("expected SignatureVerificationConfigured() to be false when pubkey is empty")
}
// verifyChecksumsSignature should be a no-op when no key is embedded.
if err := verifyChecksumsSignature(context.Background(), "0.0.0", []byte("anything")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected nil when pubkey is empty, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestSignatureRejectsMalformedPubKey(t *testing.T) {
withReleasePubKey(t, "not-base64!!")
if _, err := loadReleasePubKey(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from malformed base64")
}
}
func TestSignatureRejectsWrongSizePubKey(t *testing.T) {
withReleasePubKey(t, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("too-short")))
if _, err := loadReleasePubKey(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from wrong-size pubkey")
}
}
func TestSignatureVerifiesGoodSignature(t *testing.T) {
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate keypair: %v", err)
}
withReleasePubKey(t, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub))
checksumsBody := []byte("deadbeef unarr_0.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz\n")
signature := ed25519.Sign(priv, checksumsBody)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "checksums.txt.sig") {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
fmt.Fprintln(w, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(signature))
}))
defer srv.Close()
prevHost := updateBaseURL
updateBaseURL = srv.URL
t.Cleanup(func() { updateBaseURL = prevHost })
fix(security): UPnP opt-in, bounded SSE reader, signed self-update Phase 2 security audit follow-up. Three independent hardenings against the unauthenticated daemon surface, the long-lived agent SSE stream and the self-update channel. UPnP is now opt-in. The stream port + /hls endpoints have no auth, so publishing them on the WAN via the gateway was a default that exposed active downloads to anyone scanning the operator's external IP. New config downloads.enable_upnp (default false) gates the mapping; LAN and Tailscale clients continue to work unchanged. A startup log makes the new default visible. The agent SSE reader now uses a bounded bufio.Scanner instead of an unbounded ReadString. A hostile or buggy server can no longer grow daemon memory by streaming a single line forever or by emitting unbounded data: continuation lines — both are capped at 256 KiB and 1 MiB respectively, and an error is surfaced so SignalLoop reconnects. Self-update now verifies an ed25519 signature over checksums.txt when the binary was built with a release public key embedded (injected via goreleaser ldflags from RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY). The companion scripts/sign-checksums runs in the release workflow when both the public-key variable and the private-key secret are present, uploading checksums.txt.sig next to the existing checksums file. Builds without the embedded key continue to update with SHA256-only verification; a --allow-unsigned flag is provided so users on a signed build can still install pre-signing releases or recover from an accidental unsigned release. A new scripts/gen-release-key helper documents the one-time keypair generation procedure required before flipping signing on.
2026-05-15 17:29:22 +02:00
if err := verifyChecksumsSignature(context.Background(), "0.0.0", checksumsBody); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("verifyChecksumsSignature(good) = %v, want nil", err)
}
}
func TestSignatureRejectsBadSignature(t *testing.T) {
pub, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate keypair: %v", err)
}
withReleasePubKey(t, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub))
// Sign with a DIFFERENT private key — should be rejected.
_, other, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
body := []byte("checksum-line\n")
badSig := ed25519.Sign(other, body)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintln(w, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(badSig))
}))
defer srv.Close()
prevHost := updateBaseURL
updateBaseURL = srv.URL
t.Cleanup(func() { updateBaseURL = prevHost })
fix(security): UPnP opt-in, bounded SSE reader, signed self-update Phase 2 security audit follow-up. Three independent hardenings against the unauthenticated daemon surface, the long-lived agent SSE stream and the self-update channel. UPnP is now opt-in. The stream port + /hls endpoints have no auth, so publishing them on the WAN via the gateway was a default that exposed active downloads to anyone scanning the operator's external IP. New config downloads.enable_upnp (default false) gates the mapping; LAN and Tailscale clients continue to work unchanged. A startup log makes the new default visible. The agent SSE reader now uses a bounded bufio.Scanner instead of an unbounded ReadString. A hostile or buggy server can no longer grow daemon memory by streaming a single line forever or by emitting unbounded data: continuation lines — both are capped at 256 KiB and 1 MiB respectively, and an error is surfaced so SignalLoop reconnects. Self-update now verifies an ed25519 signature over checksums.txt when the binary was built with a release public key embedded (injected via goreleaser ldflags from RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY). The companion scripts/sign-checksums runs in the release workflow when both the public-key variable and the private-key secret are present, uploading checksums.txt.sig next to the existing checksums file. Builds without the embedded key continue to update with SHA256-only verification; a --allow-unsigned flag is provided so users on a signed build can still install pre-signing releases or recover from an accidental unsigned release. A new scripts/gen-release-key helper documents the one-time keypair generation procedure required before flipping signing on.
2026-05-15 17:29:22 +02:00
err = verifyChecksumsSignature(context.Background(), "0.0.0", body)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "verification failed") {
t.Fatalf("expected verification failure, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestSignatureMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
pub, _, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
withReleasePubKey(t, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub))
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
}))
defer srv.Close()
prevHost := updateBaseURL
updateBaseURL = srv.URL
t.Cleanup(func() { updateBaseURL = prevHost })
fix(security): UPnP opt-in, bounded SSE reader, signed self-update Phase 2 security audit follow-up. Three independent hardenings against the unauthenticated daemon surface, the long-lived agent SSE stream and the self-update channel. UPnP is now opt-in. The stream port + /hls endpoints have no auth, so publishing them on the WAN via the gateway was a default that exposed active downloads to anyone scanning the operator's external IP. New config downloads.enable_upnp (default false) gates the mapping; LAN and Tailscale clients continue to work unchanged. A startup log makes the new default visible. The agent SSE reader now uses a bounded bufio.Scanner instead of an unbounded ReadString. A hostile or buggy server can no longer grow daemon memory by streaming a single line forever or by emitting unbounded data: continuation lines — both are capped at 256 KiB and 1 MiB respectively, and an error is surfaced so SignalLoop reconnects. Self-update now verifies an ed25519 signature over checksums.txt when the binary was built with a release public key embedded (injected via goreleaser ldflags from RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY). The companion scripts/sign-checksums runs in the release workflow when both the public-key variable and the private-key secret are present, uploading checksums.txt.sig next to the existing checksums file. Builds without the embedded key continue to update with SHA256-only verification; a --allow-unsigned flag is provided so users on a signed build can still install pre-signing releases or recover from an accidental unsigned release. A new scripts/gen-release-key helper documents the one-time keypair generation procedure required before flipping signing on.
2026-05-15 17:29:22 +02:00
err := verifyChecksumsSignature(context.Background(), "0.0.0", []byte("body"))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingSignature) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrMissingSignature, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestDecodeSignatureRejectsRaw(t *testing.T) {
// 64-byte payload that happens NOT to be valid base64 must error rather
// than be silently accepted as a raw signature — the only legitimate
// shape is base64-encoded text.
raw := make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize)
for i := range raw {
raw[i] = 0xff
}
if _, err := decodeSignature(raw); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from non-base64 64-byte payload")
}
}