unarr/internal/agent/state.go

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3.9 KiB
Go
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package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"github.com/torrentclaw/unarr/internal/config"
)
// ErrDaemonNotRunning is returned when no daemon state file exists on disk.
// Callers may wrap it with %w; downstream code uses errors.Is to detect it.
// NOTE: the message text is matched by the sentry package (string-match, to
// avoid an import cycle). Keep the prefix "daemon does not appear to be
// running" stable, or update sentry.daemonNotRunningMarker accordingly.
var ErrDaemonNotRunning = errors.New("daemon does not appear to be running (state file not found)")
// DaemonState is written to disk every heartbeat for external tools to read.
type DaemonState struct {
AgentID string `json:"agentId"`
Status string `json:"status"` // running | upgrading | shutting_down
Version string `json:"version"`
PID int `json:"pid"`
StartedAt time.Time `json:"startedAt"`
LastHeartbeat time.Time `json:"lastHeartbeat"`
ActiveTasks int `json:"activeTasks"`
CompletedCount int `json:"completedCount"`
FailedCount int `json:"failedCount"`
TotalDownloaded int64 `json:"totalDownloaded"`
MethodStats map[string]int `json:"methodStats,omitempty"`
// Managed-VPN split-tunnel state, so `unarr vpn status` can report whether
// torrent traffic is actually being routed through the tunnel (vs. the daemon
// running but the tunnel having failed to come up → downloading in the clear).
VPNActive bool `json:"vpnActive,omitempty"`
VPNMode string `json:"vpnMode,omitempty"` // managed | self-hosted
VPNServer string `json:"vpnServer,omitempty"` // WireGuard endpoint (ip:port)
feat(funnel): cloudflare quick tunnel embedded subprocess (0.9.5) Gives the daemon a public HTTPS hostname (`https://<random>.trycloudflare.com`) so the in-browser player on torrentclaw.com plays cross-network without Tailscale or port forwarding — the mixed-content block that was breaking HTTPS-page → HTTP-daemon fetches is gone. Bytes proxy through CloudFlare, never through TorrentClaw infra (preserves the aggregator legal posture). New surface: • `internal/funnel/` package: subprocess wrapper + auto-download for cloudflared. Linux amd64/arm64/armhf/386 fetched from GitHub releases on first run, validated by ELF magic + size sanity, O_EXCL partial write so concurrent daemons don't clobber each other. • `unarr funnel on/off/status` cobra command (sibling of `unarr vpn`). • Daemon supervisor goroutine keeps cloudflared up across crashes + CF's ~6h Quick Tunnel rotation. Exponential backoff (2 s → 5 min). On exit the reported URL is cleared so the web stops handing out a dead host. • Wire: agent registers/syncs a FunnelURL field; web prefers it over Tailscale/LAN for in-browser playback (HlsStreamPlayer + Stremio addon). Default ON for fresh installs (NAS/Docker get it without terminal-in); existing configs that pre-date the feature stay off until the operator opts in with `unarr funnel on`. Docker image now bundles cloudflared (built per TARGETARCH via buildx). Also fixed: libx264 'frame MB size > level limit' on anamorphic >16:9 sources. The level we hint to libx264 was derived from height alone, which busted on 720p cinemascope (1728×720 = 4860 MBs > level 3.1's 3600). Bumped each tier: 720p → 4.0, 1080p → 4.1. Version: 0.9.4 → 0.9.5.
2026-05-26 20:39:57 +02:00
// CloudFlare Quick Tunnel state, so `unarr funnel status` can report the
// HTTPS hostname the daemon is reachable at from anywhere on the internet.
// Empty when the funnel is off or hasn't registered yet.
FunnelURL string `json:"funnelUrl,omitempty"`
}
// stateFilePathFn is overridable for testing.
var stateFilePathFn = func() string {
return filepath.Join(config.DataDir(), "daemon.state.json")
}
// StateFilePath returns the path to the daemon state file.
func StateFilePath() string {
return stateFilePathFn()
}
// WriteState writes the daemon state to disk (best-effort, never errors).
func WriteState(state *DaemonState) {
path := StateFilePath()
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755)
data, err := json.MarshalIndent(state, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return
}
fix(security): CORS allowlist, URL scheme guard, state perms, ZIP slip, mirror docs Phase 3 security audit follow-up. Medium and low-severity hardenings plus a deferred-work plan for the cross-repo stream-token rollout. Stream server CORS: replace the wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin with an allowlist that echoes back only torrentclaw.com, app.torrentclaw.com, the local Next dev port (3030 — matches the web repo package.json) and any extras the operator adds via the new downloads.cors_extra_origins TOML key. A Vary: Origin header is now emitted whenever the request carries an Origin header so an intermediate cache cannot serve a stale ACAO to a different origin. URL scheme guard: openBrowser and OpenPlayer refuse any URL that is not http(s). Combined with passing the URL after "--" wherever the launched helper supports it (open, mpv, vlc, cvlc), this stops a leading "-" from being parsed as a switch by the spawned process. State file permissions: WriteState now writes 0o600 so the agent ID, PID and counters cannot be enumerated by another local user on a shared host. Matches the existing config file mode. ZIP slip defense-in-depth: extractZip extracts the safety check into safeZipPath, which canonicalises the entry name (normalising backslashes to "/"), rejects "..", "../" prefix and "/../" interior components, and verifies the final destination stays inside destDir before opening any file. Mirror fallback: documented the design for multi-provider mirrors.json hosting in the comment block on DefaultStaticFallbackURLs and added a follow-up note about signing it with the same ed25519 release key. The list is kept at one provider until the second host is provisioned and added to torrentclaw-web's STATIC_FALLBACKS. Deferred work: a new plan document Docs/plans/security-stream-token.md covers the per-task stream token (Phase 2.2 of the original audit) which requires coordinated web + CLI work and ships separately.
2026-05-15 18:48:59 +02:00
// Write to temp file then rename for atomicity. 0o600 keeps the file
// readable only by the owning user — the state contains agentID, PID
// and counters which are useful to a co-tenant on a shared host for
// fingerprinting the daemon, and we already use 0o600 for the config
// file. No need for cross-user readability here.
tmp := path + ".tmp"
fix(security): CORS allowlist, URL scheme guard, state perms, ZIP slip, mirror docs Phase 3 security audit follow-up. Medium and low-severity hardenings plus a deferred-work plan for the cross-repo stream-token rollout. Stream server CORS: replace the wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin with an allowlist that echoes back only torrentclaw.com, app.torrentclaw.com, the local Next dev port (3030 — matches the web repo package.json) and any extras the operator adds via the new downloads.cors_extra_origins TOML key. A Vary: Origin header is now emitted whenever the request carries an Origin header so an intermediate cache cannot serve a stale ACAO to a different origin. URL scheme guard: openBrowser and OpenPlayer refuse any URL that is not http(s). Combined with passing the URL after "--" wherever the launched helper supports it (open, mpv, vlc, cvlc), this stops a leading "-" from being parsed as a switch by the spawned process. State file permissions: WriteState now writes 0o600 so the agent ID, PID and counters cannot be enumerated by another local user on a shared host. Matches the existing config file mode. ZIP slip defense-in-depth: extractZip extracts the safety check into safeZipPath, which canonicalises the entry name (normalising backslashes to "/"), rejects "..", "../" prefix and "/../" interior components, and verifies the final destination stays inside destDir before opening any file. Mirror fallback: documented the design for multi-provider mirrors.json hosting in the comment block on DefaultStaticFallbackURLs and added a follow-up note about signing it with the same ed25519 release key. The list is kept at one provider until the second host is provisioned and added to torrentclaw-web's STATIC_FALLBACKS. Deferred work: a new plan document Docs/plans/security-stream-token.md covers the per-task stream token (Phase 2.2 of the original audit) which requires coordinated web + CLI work and ships separately.
2026-05-15 18:48:59 +02:00
if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, data, 0o600); err != nil {
return
}
os.Rename(tmp, path)
}
// ReadState reads the daemon state from disk. Returns nil if not found or
// unreadable. Use LoadState when callers need to distinguish "not running"
// from "state file corrupted".
func ReadState() *DaemonState {
state, _ := LoadState()
return state
}
// LoadState reads the daemon state and returns explicit errors:
// - ErrDaemonNotRunning when the state file does not exist
// - a wrapped json error when the file exists but cannot be decoded
// (a real bug worth reporting to Sentry)
func LoadState() (*DaemonState, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(StateFilePath())
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, ErrDaemonNotRunning
}
return nil, err
}
var state DaemonState
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &state); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode daemon state %s: %w", StateFilePath(), err)
}
return &state, nil
}
// RemoveState deletes the state file (called on clean shutdown).
func RemoveState() {
os.Remove(StateFilePath())
}